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I. Introduction 
The case of The Arrogante Barcelones involved a complicated story of facts, due in part 
to the cunningness of one of the main players, Joseph Almeida.1  Unraveling the circumstances2 
of how the case came to the United States Supreme Court has more to do with the antics of 
Joseph Almeida, than other typical captures at sea.  However, Almeida’s maneuvers are easier to 
follow with an understanding of nineteenth century Baltimore, the War of 1812, and U.S. 
citizens’ involvement in South American privateering.3  At first glance, this case appeared to 
focus on issues that were raised regarding the validity of Almeida’s commission, the authority of 
the condemnation, and the sufficiency of the documentation produced to prove it.4  However, the 
United States Supreme Court ultimately avoids untangling those maritime issues and instead 
bases its opinion in a more unusual category of law,5 opening up issues still relevant to that 
subject today.6 
II. Background 
To understand the setting that leads to the United States Supreme Court case, The 
Arrogante Barcelones,7 it is necessary to explore the growth of Baltimore and its merchants,8 the 
role in the War of 1812,9 and its privateersmen in international maritime presence10. 
A. Baltimore’s Ascension to an American Trading Power 
Having more than doubled in population and increased exports over sevenfold between 
the first federal census in 1790 and the second in 1800, Baltimore became the third commercial 
                                                 
1 Infra Part VIII. 
2 Infra Part III.; Infra Part IV. 
3 Infra Part II. 
4 Infra Part IV.; Infra Part V.A.; Infra Part V.B.; Infra Part V.C. 
5 Infra Part V.D.  
6 Infra Part VI. 
7 The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. 496 (1822). 
8 Infra Part II.A. 
9 Infra Part II.B. 
10 Infra Part II.C. 
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port of the Union.11  Baltimore became a chartered city on December 31, 1796.12  This new 
charter allowed the municipal authority to enact ordinances that helped to effectuate progress, 
preservation, and deepening in the inner harbor.13  Among all the necessities of expansion facing 
the blooming city, the chief objective on citizen’s minds was the harbor.14  While the entire city 
developed, the “small circumscribed area of sixty acres was to prove the nucleus of the future 
great port, the maritime City of Baltimore.”15  Thus, at the turn of the century, Baltimore was the 
youngest of the chief commercial cities on the eastern seaboard.16 
Merchants were not only interested in the import and export business flourishing in the 
Baltimore Harbor, but also investing in shipbuilding.  Merchants were interested both in 
investing in the endeavor, and also in financing their own ships.  Baltimore merchants accounted 
for approximately fifty-six percent of the investments in ships, where non-merchants only made 
up for twenty-six percent.17  One of the factors that contributed very heavily to Baltimore’s 
reputation in the maritime industry was the superior construction and sailing abilities of its 
schooners, which became known as the world famous “Baltimore clippers.”18  The Baltimore 
clipper first appeared in the Revolutionary War.  By 1800 the Baltimore clipper was extremely 
popular with privateersmen, slavers, smugglers, and almost anyone who wished to conduct 
business privately.19  It is on brink of Baltimore booming into the maritime industry that Joseph 
                                                 
11 CLAYTON COLMAN HALL, BALTIMORE: ITS HISTORY AND ITS PEOPLE 63 (1912). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 64. 
14 Id. This was a time when tobacco was the principal export into the United States. Id. 
15 Id. at 66. 
16 Id. at 63. 
17 Geoffrey Gilbert, THE BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW, Maritime Enterprise in the New Republic: Investment in 
Baltimore Shipping, 1789-1793 18 (1984). 
18 JOHN PHILIPS CRANWELL & WILLIAM BOWERS CRANE, MEN OF MARQUE: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE ARMED 
VESSELS OUT OF BALTIMORE DURING THE WAR OF 1812, 37 (W. W. NORTON & CO. INC. 1940). 
19 Id.  "The chief characteristics of these craft were long, light, and extremely raking masts; very little rigging; low 
freeboard; great rake to stem and stern posts, with a great deal of drag to the keel. . . . Their deadrise was great and 
bilges slack. The beam was usually great for their length. Nearly always flush-decked, they had wide, clear decks, 
5 
Almeida arrived in Baltimore and quickly built a reputation as a skilled seaman.20 
B. Baltimore Merchants’ Role in the War of 1812 
While the Embargo Act of April 4, 1812 had cut back on trade, the declaration of the War 
of 1812 brought a new daring enterprise to Baltimore: privateering.21  The purpose of the 
embargo act was twofold.22   First, it shielded American ships from enemy capture once war was 
declared.23  Secondly, it prevented food from being shipped to British troops on the Iberian 
Peninsula.24  However, the farsighted Baltimore businessmen better understood what the 
embargo meant to business, and anticipated commissions from President Madison.25  Some 
Baltimore businessmen had even begun converting their fastest vessels from merchantmen to 
commerce raiders.26  
“That act of Congress turned Baltimore from a peaceful trading center into a hive of 
privateering activity which ceased only with the end of the war.”27  More privateers were 
commissioned out of Baltimore than any other port in the United States, and Baltimore was 
known for producing privateers instrumental to the cause.28   By August 18, 1812, there were 
fifty-six privateers at sea from the United States and of those thirteen were from Baltimore.29  
Baltimore privateers were more numerous than those from any other port and usually surpassed 
others in the havoc they wrecked on enemy commerce.30  “The city’s location made it an 
                                                                                                                                                             
suitable for working the ships and handling the guns. When engaged in privateering, they often had high bulwarks, 
particularly in vessels of the larger class." Id. (quoting Howard I. Chapelle from his book, The Baltimore Clipper). 
20 Jeffrey Orenstein, Joseph Almeida: Portrait of a Privateer, Pirate & Plaintiff, Part II, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 35 
(2008) [hereinafter Orenstein Part II]. 
21 Sherry Olson, Commerce is the Mainspring, 41-70, 46. 
22 Cranwell & Crane, supra note 18, at 24-25.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Cranwell & Crane, supra note 18, at 15. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Olson, supra note 21, at 46. 
29 Cranwell & Crane, supra note 18, at 34. 
30 Id. 
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important port; Baltimore vessels were numerous and well manned; her merchants were used to 
taking chances…; and the spirit of the men who made their living either directly or indirectly 
from the sea was very much in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war.”31  Another one of the 
factors that largely contributed to Baltimore’s impact on the War of 1812 was the superior 
construction, sailing quality, speed, and maneuverability of the “Baltimore clippers.”32    
Privateers were essentially licensed predators, which were equipped precisely for 
commerce raiding.33  While privateers lacked considerable cargo-carrying capability, they were 
heavily armed and manned for combat situations.34  Even more unique was that the crew did not 
earn a salary, but instead were often compensated solely from the prize proceeds.35  In order to 
be a sanctioned privateer, one needed a commission or a letter of marque.36  In the United States, 
the U.S. Constitution vested the power to commission privateers in the Congress.37  Congress in 
turn delegated that power to officials of the State Department.38  Commissions would generally 
include the essential privateer information including the rig, tonnage, names of the vessel, 
owners, captain, number of guns, and size of the crew.39  Commissions were additionally 
accompanied by instructions to privateers, or written orders by the United States government.40  
The instructions were meant to confine the conduct of privateers to those acceptable under the 
law of nations, but also shield the United States from any embarrassing claims by neutral 
                                                 
31 Id. at 35. 
32 Id. at 37. 
33 Donald A. Petrie, The Prize Game: Lawful Looting on the High Seas in the Days of Fighting Sail, NAVAL 
INSTITUTE PRESS, 4 (1999). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 9. 
37 Id. at 10. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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countries.41  If a privateer was violated of the instructions or neutrality laws, they could stand to 
lose their prize, bonds, commissions, and possibly even have to pay damages.42   
While it was ultimately the captor’s master who selected the port and prize court once a 
belligerent ship was captured, she was usually brought to the nearest port.43  Generally, the 
captor had some discretion in determining the prize court,44 but the law of nations required the 
captor to consider the convenience to the captured vessel’s owners or cargo shippers.45  A blatant 
neglect for the convenience of claimant could result in a loss of the prize in court and assessment 
of damages against the captors.46  Similarly, an unlawful capture of a ship (either by a privateer 
with false papers or of a neutral) could lead to negative results in court.47   
The law of nations designed the maritime judicial process to allow seafarers to play their 
part and depart early on from court proceedings.48  When possible, courts used exclusively the 
ships documents and both crews’ testimonies to promptly determine whether there was a lawful 
prize.49  To be efficient, crewmembers’ testimony was taken by standing interrogatories—the 
approved forms of judicial questionnaires.50  These testimonies were taken before the 
commissioners of the court in isolated areas to quickly and privately streamline the process.51  If 
the ship was deemed a lawful and good prize based on the documents provided, the ship and the 
cargo were condemned and sold, leaving the court to hold the proceeds.52  The court first 
distributed the proceeds to valid neutral claim.  If the prize was captured by a navy warship, the 
                                                 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 153.  
44 The captor was able to consider the weather, the condition of the chase, and the chances of enemy interception in 
his decision on which port, and court, to direct the captured vessel. Id. at 154. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 159. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 160. 
52 Id. at 161. 
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remaining proceeds were distributed amongst the captor’s sovereign.  However, if the captor was 
a civilian privateer, the sovereign waived its share and the proceeds were distributed amongst 
only the captor’s crew.53   
Baltimore became a standout during the War of 1812, but so did Almeida.  During the 
War of 1812 Almeida was captain of the schooner Caroline, and subsequently of the schooner 
Kemp.54  While captain of those vessels, Almeida captured no fewer than thirty-five British ships 
and made almost $300,ooo in net prize proceeds.55  Almeida’s skill as a sailor and strategist not 
only increased his value to his financier-partners, but also made him a war hero.56  For example, 
on the morning of December 1, 1814, the Kemp’s lookout spotted a convoy of nine British 
vessels.57  Though a massive British frigate guarded the fleet, Almeida, in perhaps the brashest 
move by a Baltimore privateersman, singlehandedly took on the convoy.58  The engagement 
began in the early afternoon and continued well into the next morning.59  In the end, Almeida 
had skillfully out sailed and outfought seven of the vessels, and captured five.60  Naval historians 
have ranked that triumph as one of the great privateer achievements of the War of 1812.61   
When hostilities with Britain ended, Almeida was forced to trade the thrill of privateering 
for the humdrum of merchant shipping.62  While running cargo in the Friends Hope, Almeida 
learned that the Spanish had gained control of what is today Carthagena, Columbia.63  Almeida’s 
merchant experience during the Embargo Act of 1807 had taught him that contraband was the 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Cranwell & Crane, supra note 18, at 209. 
55 Jeffrey Orenstein, Joseph Almeida: Portrait of a Privateer, Pirate & Plaintiff, Part I, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 307, 312 
(2007) [hereinafter Orenstein Part I]. 
56 Id. 
57 Cranwell & Crane, supra note 18, at 218. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 218-220. 
60 Id. 
61 Orenstein Part I, supra note 55, at 312. 
62 Id. at 315. 
63 Id. 
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most lucrative cargo.64  Knowing that trade with Carthagena would be banned, Almeida 
redirected his course to Columbia.65  Unfortunately, the Spanish were more deceptive than 
Almeida anticipated, and the Spanish captured the Friends Hope along with her captain and 
crew.66  After excessively brutal treatment by the Spanish, they eventually released Almeida, but 
kept the Friends Hope.67  
C. Baltimore Privateers Assisting in the South American Revolutions 
After the end of the War of 1812 American vessels were offered no opportunities for 
United States government sanctioned prize taking.68  Even though the United States did not 
engage in war involving attacks on maritime commerce,69 Americans were not deterred from 
prize taking and privateering.70  Instead, American privateers found a new cause to support.71  
Some of the unemployed Baltimore vessels harnessed their energies to support the cause of the 
Spanish-American revolutions.72  Unfortunately outfitting vessels and accepting commissions 
from revolutionary South American Governments at war with Spain directly conflicted with the 
United States policy of neutrality.73  “Serving the South American republics in this manner was 
illegal, as U.S. law prohibited any American from owning, commanding, or sailing aboard a 
foreign privateer that intended to attack a nation at peace with the United States.”74  Ultimately, 
the potential profits from South American privateering ventures were too enticing and 
substantially outweighed the legal ramifications that faced each shareholder standing to gain a 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Petrie, supra note 33, at 140.  
69 Id. 
70 Olson, supra note 21, at 46. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 David Head, A Different Kind of Maritime Predation: South American Privateering from Baltimore, 1816-1820, 7 
INT’L J. NAVAL HIST. (2008) [hereinafter A Different Kind of Maritime Predation]. 
74 Id. 
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fortune.75    
Although the South American privateering clearly violated the United States’ neutrality 
laws, Baltimore privateers were not deterred.  In fact, Baltimore became the epicenter for 
privateering in the service of new republics.76  In 1816 a syndicate of very silent partnerships 
formed in the counting houses of Baltimore to back a fleet of “patriot privateers.”77  Many 
“respectable” Baltimore merchants publically disapproved of this activity, but a number did 
privately participate in “the American Concern.”78  For example, “politically active Baltimoreans 
such as General William Winder, attorney William Pinkney, collector of the port James 
McCulloch, and postmaster John Skinner were involved in the legal defense of the concern.”79  
According to then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, the business of patriot privateering not 
only “spread over a large portion of the merchants” in Baltimore, but had also “infected almost 
every officer of the United States in the place.”80   
“According to Adams, the district attorney, Elias Glenn, in addition to being ‘a weak, 
incompetent man,’ had ‘a son concerned in the privateers’; the postmaster, John Skinner, 
had been ‘indicted for being concerned in the piratical privateers’; the customs collector, 
James McCulloh, was ‘an enthusiast for the South Americans, and easily duped by 
knaves’; the ‘Inspectors of the Revenue were in the habit of receiving presents from the 
importing merchants’; and somehow, privateers were never caught smuggling their prize 
goods into Baltimore.”81 
 
The entrance of several other revolutionary governments into privateering increased the activity 
in South American privateering.82  In Baltimore, the more prominent revolutionary government 
was the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, which became known as Buenos Aires, and later 
                                                 
75 Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 36.   
76 Olson, supra note 21, at 46–47. 
77 Orenstein Part I, supra note 55, at 36. 
78 Olson, supra note 21, at 47. 
79 Id. 
80 Orenstein Part I, supra note 55, at 322-323 (quoting 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 377 (Charles Francis 
Adams, ed., 1875)). 
81 Id. at 323 (quoting 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 377 (Charles Francis Adams, ed., 1875)). 
82 Charles C. Giffin, Privateering from Baltimore During the Spanish American Wars of Independence, 35 MD. 
HISTORICAL MAGAZINE 1, 4 (1940). 
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Argentina.83  
Such was the situation in early 1816 when Thomas Taylor84 appeared in Baltimore.85  He 
brought with him six privateering licenses signed in blank for the purposes of organizing a 
campaign against Spanish seaborne commerce, on behalf of the rebellious Buenos Aires 
government that was incapable of combating the Spanish at sea.86  In return for their service, 
privateer captains would receive a substantial share of the prize proceeds.87  Taylor painted an 
alluring picture of the possibilities awaiting those who took advantage of his offer.88  He arrived 
to Baltimore about the same time Almeida arrived back from his imprisonment in Carthagena 
angry and distraught.89  Providentially, Taylor quickly approached Almeida with his business 
proposition to assist Buenos Aires in its struggle for liberation by preying on Spanish ships.90 
In all his time imprisoned by the Spanish, Almeida could not have dreamed of a better 
offer.  This South American privateering opportunity meant that he would “replenish his estate, 
avenge the indignities he had suffered in Carthagena, avoid the tedium of the merchant trade, and 
serve the cause of liberty—most likely in that order.”91  Of the many Baltimoreans who 
undertook privateering for the South American rebel governments, Almeida was most clear as to 
                                                 
83 Id.  
84 Thomas Taylor was born in Bermuda, but had immigrated to the United States and had become a citizen resident 
of Wilmington, Delaware. Eventually in 1810 Taylor took up residence in Buenos Aires and sailed for some time a 
privateer on its behalf. Eventually, Taylor established his connection with Baltimore, Maryland in 1816 when he 
arrived with six letters of marque and reprisal against Spanish seaborne commerce. Fred Hopkins, For Freedom and 
Profit: Baltimore Privateers in the Wars of South American Independence, XVIII Nos. 3-4 THE NORTHERN 
MARINER 93, 94 (July–Oct. 2008). 
85 Id. at 3. 
86 Id. 
87 Orenstein Part I, supra note 55, at 316. 
88 Giffin, supra note 82, at 3. 
89 Orenstein Part I, supra note 55, at 315. 
90 Id. at 316.   
91 Id. 
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his motive: revenge.92  The excessive cruelty Almeida experienced from the Spanish had 
embittered him.93  “Cartagena [is] ever memorable to me by the cruelties which I received from 
[Spanish General] Morillo and his army,” stated Almeida.94  He explained that his resentment for 
his loss of the Friends Hope and his personal injuries were what carried him into the South 
American service.95  So, Almeida took Taylor up on his offer.96  Taylor provided the 
commission,97 and Almeida became a citizen of the Buenos Aires—a country the United States 
government had not yet recognized.98 With his vendetta against the Spanish arranged, Almeida 
set off in his first of many cruises against the Spanish.99   
“After just his first two cruises,100 “Almeida had successfully interrupted supply lines 
between Spain and its colonies, intercepted royal communications, and looted Spanish vessels 
and cargos worth several million dollars.”101  But Almeida may have been too successful, 
“because the injury and humiliation he heaped upon the Spanish crown was ultimately his 
undoing.”102  After being acquitted for violating neutrality laws,103 Almeida again set sail for his 
third cruise on behalf of Buenos Aires in the summer of 1817.104   His destination was the area 
between the Azores and the Canary Islands, where several trading routes converged.105  While 
                                                 
92 David Head, Independence on the Quarterdeck: Three Baltimore Seafarers, Spanish America, and the Lives of 
Captains in the Early American Republic, 23 THE NORTHERN MARINER 1, 10 (2013) [hereinafter Independence on 
the Quarterdeck]. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Orenstein Part I, supra note 55, at 316. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 318. 
99 Independence on the Quarterdeck, supra note 92, at 11. 
100 Almeida had cruised first in the West Indies and second off the coast of Spain.  Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, 
at 37. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 U.S. v. Orb 
104 Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 37.  
105 Id. at 38. 
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captain of the Congreso, Almeida boarded at least 165 vessels.106  A majority of the vessels were 
neutral, and so Almeida let them go.107  But the twenty-four Spanish vessels Almeida excitedly 
and excessively pillaged.108  The most valuable ships were delivered to Buenos Aires and the rest 
were plundered and torched at sea.109 
III. The Voyage and the Capture 
After a rigorous summer cruise, Almeida determined that the Congreso’s best days were 
behind her.110  Instead of enlisting his Baltimore financiers to refit the Congreso, Almeida 
decided to use his prize proceeds and strike out on his own.111  He purchased one of his best 
trophies captured by the Congreso, the frigate Diana, and rechristened her the Louisa.112  
Almeida then had the Louisa commissioned as a Buenos Airean privateer and set out for Fells 
Point in Baltimore, Maryland.113  Since Baltimore was a hotspot for “patriot privateers,” it was 
the best place for Almeida to have the Louisa refitted for privateering and to recruit an adequate 
amount of seasoned crewmen.114  In order to avoid arrest or seizure, with the U.S. legal system 
cracking down on Almeida, the Louisa posed as a merchant ship temporarily commissioned 
under Ezra Drew, one of Almeida’s officers.115  In fact, Almeida hid in the cargo hold when the 
Louisa drifted quietly into Baltimore harbor in April 1818.116  Almeida entered Baltimore 
without detection, deposited his prize money, visited his family, and slyly equipped the Louisa as 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id.; The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. 496 (1822). 
113 The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. 496 (1822) Case Papers at 1 [hereinafter Case Papers]; Orenstein Part II, 
supra note 20, at 38. 
114 Orenstein Part II, supra note 55, at 39. 
115 Id. 
116 The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. at 496-497; Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 39-40; 
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a privateer.117 
On August 1, 1818 after four months of work, the Louisa appeared in the shadow of Fort 
McHenry.118  Upon her initial departure, only ten guns and some small arms, and a ninety-six 
men crew made up of mostly United States citizens, armed the Louisa.119  However, the 
transformation of the Louisa was not complete. 120 About four days out from Baltimore, the 
Louisa anchored at the entrance of the Patuxent River to rendezvous with a pilot boat.121  That 
pilot boat delivered: six eighteen-pound gunnades, twenty-six muskets, eighteen pistols, 
seventeen cutlasses, thirty kegs of powder, eighty round shot, fifty star shot, and two kegs of 
musket balls.122  The Louisa was now ready for her maiden cruise as a privateer. 
When the Louisa originally left Baltimore approximately half of the seaman onboard had 
signed articles for a sealing voyage to the Northwest coast of America for $16 a month.123  After 
the Louisa was about fifteen days out to sea, Almeida announced the true mission of the vessel 
and demanded that the entire crew sign new privateering articles.124  Many of the crew refused to 
sign the privateering articles, but not due to complete outrage of Almeida’s deception or fear of 
legal troubles back in the United States for violating neutrality laws.125  Besides, the crew had to 
have known the true mission when four days into the voyage the Louisa received such excessive 
armory.126  Even the Niles Weekly Register considered Almeida’s cover ridiculously apparent.  
                                                 
117The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. at 496-497; Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 39-40. 
118 Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 40. 
119 The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. at 497. 
120 Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 40. 
121 The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. at 497; Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 40. 
122 Deposition of Lt. Smith, Bernabeu v. the brig Arrogante Barcelones and her cargo; Orenstein Part II, supra note 
20, at 40. 
123 The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. at 497; Independence on the Quarterdeck, supra note 92, at 11; Orenstein Part 
II, supra note 20, at 40. 
124 The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. at 497; Independence on the Quarterdeck, supra note 92, at 11; Orenstein Part 
II, supra note 20, at 40. 
125 The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. at 497; Independence on the Quarterdeck, supra note 92, at 11; Orenstein Part 
II, supra note 20, at 40. 
126 Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 40. 
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When they reported, upon Almeida’s request, that the ship Louisa was “bound round Cape Horn, 
on a sealing voyage!” they jokingly added that with “16 heavy guns and 101 men,” Almeida 
would “no doubt do great execution on the coasts of Peru!”127  It is speculated that the true 
reason many of the crew refused to sign the privateering articles is because they felt their 
negotiating power was so strong at sea that they could stand to gain a greater share of the 
profits.128  However Almeida dispelled the dissenters with grand threats of violence and 
abandonment to those who refused to sign.129  Almeida ordered the few remaining crewmembers 
who refused to sign the new privateering documents be put in irons—two were even put on 
board another vessel.130 
With the captain and crew now on the same page,131 Almeida continued the Louisa on 
her intended voyage across the Atlantic Ocean.132  They proceeded to cruise off Lisbon about 
nine leagues from Corunna on the northwest coast of Spain.133  On September 9, 1818 Almeida 
                                                 
127 Id.; NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER, Sep. 5, 1818. 
128 Independence on the Quarterdeck, supra note 92, at 11; Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 40. 
129 Independence on the Quarterdeck, supra note 92, at 11; Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 40-41. 
130 The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. at 497; Independence on the Quarterdeck, supra note 92, at 11; Orenstein Part 
II, supra note 20, at 40-41.  
131 I believe at this point there were still disgruntled crewmembers, but instead of continuing to push Almeida they 
laid in wait for the opportunity to strike.  This time would come immediately after Almeida left the Louisa on a prize 
ship. 
132 Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 41. 
133 Id. 
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spotted a brig showing British colors.134  He ordered that his own British flag be raised while the 
Louisa stalked the vessel.135  Once the vessel was within gunshot, Almeida raised the Louisa’s 
actual Buenos Airean flag and ordered a series of shots from his bowchasers to make the chase 
heave to.136 Almost simultaneously the other brig replaced her British flag with the Royal 
Spanish flag, but quickly hauled it down after realizing her pursuer.137  Captain Almeida boarded 
the brig and instantly realized his extraordinary prize.138  
The brig Arrogante Barcelones was a magnificent one hundred forty and a half ton 
vessel,139 having proved to be a fast sailor during the Louisa’s pursuit.140  But even more 
impressive was her cargo.141  The brig had just returned from Caracas with cargo full of coffee, 
indigo, rum, cotton, copper, $50,000 in cocoa and a quantity of specie rumored to be between 
$150,000 and $200,000.142  Such a brilliant prize Almeida simply could not pass up.143  Instead 
                                                 
134 The Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. at 497; Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 41. 
135 Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 41. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Case Papers at 3-4. 
140 Id. 
141 Case Papers at 11-12; Id. 
142 Case Papers at 11-12; Orenstein Part II, supra note 20, at 41. 
 Case Papers at 11. 
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of sending a prize master and crew aboard the Arrogante Barcelones like usual, he personally 
sailed the brig to the prize court on the Venezuelan island of Margarita144 that was authorized to 
adjudicated prizes for Buenos Aires, and delegated the command of the Louisa to his first 
lieutenant Smith.145    
IV. The Legal Battle 
In the fall of 1818, Almeida arrived at the port of Juan Griego, in the Venezuelan island 
of Margarita where proceedings were initiated for organizing for condemnation of the Arrogante 
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locked the offices away in the forecastle and proceeded on one of the most violent piratical cruises in American 
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Clark and Henry Wolf, the apparent leaders of the munity, confessed and were hanged for their crimes. Id. 
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Barcelones and her cargo.146  On October 12, 1818 the Court of Admiralty condemned the ship 
and cargo as Spanish property and a lawful prize of war.147  However, those court documents 
were “uncommonly bald.”148  After the condemnation Almeida purchased the brig at public 
auction.149  He planned to mimic the path of the Louisa, and take the newly commissioned 
Arrogante Barcelones to be refitted in Baltimore where Almeida would again enter the port 
posing as a merchant.150  But word of the Arrogante Barcelones capture had already reached the 
Spanish consul in Baltimore, Don Juan Bautista Bernabeu.151  This time, Almeida’s disguise did 
not fool Bernabeu, who took immediate legal action when Almeida returned to Baltimore.152   
Almost immediately upon return to Baltimore, a libel was hurdled at Almeida.153  The 
libel—initiated by Berabeu—was filed by attorney John Purviance154 on behalf of the Arrogante 
Barcelones’ rightful owners.155  In order to avoid the same issues that thwarted District Attorney 
Elias Glenn in previous cases against Almeida, Purviance prolonged the proceedings in order to 
obtain his own evidence in the form of depositions to combat Almeida’s abundance of receipts, 
commissions, condemnation, and other documents manufactured in South America.156 Judge 
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James Houston’s untimely illness further delayed the proceedings, which gave Purviance more 
time to gather witness depositions.157    
When Judge Houston did not recover for an extended amount of time, President Monroe 
appointed Baltimore County Judge Theodorick Bland158 to take his place on the federal bench.159  
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams was not pleased with Judge Houston’s replacement.160  
Several reports had indicated that Judge Bland invested in patriot privateering with Postmaster 
Skinner, his brother-in-law.161  While Judge Bland proved to be innocent of the more serious 
allegations, Adams still opposed his elevation to the federal bench in 1819 because “‘it was 
impossible that he should be impartial’ with regard to ‘the most important cases pending before 
the Court’.”162 
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Since Judge Bland’s intimate and extremely controversial ties to Baltimore’s patriot 
privateering almost defeated his appointment, he eagerly showed his judicial independence from 
the cause.163  Almeida’s case was Judge Bland’s perfect opportunity.  First, Almeida had no 
major merchants or financial intersests backing his most recent enterprise in privateering on the 
Louisa or purchasing the Arrogante Barcelones.164  Secondly, even though Almeida produced a 
copy of the sentence from the Prize Court at Juan Griego that was certified by the Notary or 
Secretary of Marine, and whose signature was verified by the certificate of the deputy of the 
Republic of Colombia to the United States, the United States government had not yet received 
the Republic of Colombia in that capacity.165  Not only could Judge Bland avoid upsetting the 
upper-crust of Baltimore, but the facts of this case seemed on his side. Thus, decrees of 
restitution of the Arrogante Barcelones to her rightful Spanish owners were entered, pro forma, 
in the District and Circuit Courts.166  
V. Appeal to the United States Supreme Court 
The lower courts’ decisions in favor of the Arrogante Barcelones’ rightful Spanish 
owners left Almeida unsatisfied.  He initiated a final appeal to the United States Supreme Court 
hoping for a contrary outcome. 
A. Almeida’s Arguments 
William Winder,167 a Brigadier General in the War of 1812 and a prominent attorney in 
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Baltimore, represented Almeida as his primary attorney on the record.168  In fact, Winder 
represented Almeida in a number of other cases throughout his career.  Winder first argued that a 
settled rule of the United States Supreme Court was not to interfere with these types of cases.169  
Specifically he asserted that the evidence in this case was too debatable to justify the Court in 
denying the captor, Almeida, of the possession, the brig Arrogante Barcelones, which he 
acquired at war.170  Secondly Winder asserted that even if he was mistaken in his first argument, 
the capture of the Arrogante Barcelones did not violate the United States neutrality laws.171  He 
stated that the neutrality laws were not violated because the capture was made by the Louisa, a 
lawfully commissioned privateer of Buenos Aires whose title had been confirmed by a regular 
condemnation in the Prize Court of Venezuela, an ally of Buenos Aires in the war against 
Spain.172   Winder asserted as a universal proposition “that a sentence of condemnation by a 
competent Court is conclusive, as to the proprietary interest in the res capta, and upon the mere 
question of prize or no prize.”173  Furthermore, he argued that the United States Supreme Court 
was a neutral tribunal in the matter and therefore it was precluded “from all inquiry into the 
precious circumstances under which the capture was made, and whether the capturing vessel had 
been armed and equipped in violation of [United States’] neutrality.”174  Winder cautioned the 
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Court that there must be some limitations on inquiries into the usual sentence of condemnation 
that quiets the title acquired in war, as designated by the law of nations.175  He concluded that a 
decree of restitution in this case would “so far affect the general doctrine of conclusiveness as to 
disturb the safety of neutral purchasers.”176 
B. The Consul General of Spain’s Arguments 
Although Bernabeu had originally hired attorney John Purviance to file the libel against 
the Arrogante Barcelones and her cargo on behalf of her rightful Spanish owners, he was not the 
primary attorney on the record at the United States Supreme Court.177  Arguments on behalf of 
the brig’s rightful Spanish owners were almost entirely entered by attorney David Hoffman.178  
Hoffman presented extensive arguments compared to Almeida’s attorney, Winder.179   
First, Hoffman argued that there was not sufficient evidence of an existing condemnation 
substantiated in this case.180  All the court has been provided is the minimal and miniscule 
sentence by the Court of San Griego stating that the property is Spanish and condemning it as a 
legal prize.181  Furthermore the Court has not been provided with the libel, nor an abstract of 
proof.182  Even more complicating was that the condemnation did not provide the critical 
evidence required, like the character of the capturing vessel, who commanded the capturing 
vessel, who commissioned the capturing vessel, who owned or equipped the capturing vessel, the 
authority of the Court of San Griego to adjudicate that claims, or the connection (if any) between 
Venezuela and Buenos Aires.183  Hoffman asserted that in similarly situated cases, the Court 
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should adhere to its former rule and require the entire prize proceedings to be produced as 
evidence.184  He posited that if the Court chose not to require the entire prize proceedings, it 
should at a minimum require both the sentence and the libel—the libel proving essential.185  He 
argued that this case, more so than any other imagined, required showing the grounds and extent 
of the proceeding because “it does not appear that Almeida had any commission; and if this be 
the fact, no condemnation would avail, were it ever so well authenticated.”186 
Second, Hoffman stated that if the condemnation was adequately proved, he contended 
that the sentence was asserted by a court incompetent to adjudicate the case; that the entire 
proceeding was coram non judice187; and that the obligation to inquire into the jurisdiction of 
another court whose judgments or decrees it is to rely on belonged to all courts.188  Hoffman 
stated that under the law of nations an operative sentence of condemnation must come from 
either the court of the captor sitting in the country of the captor, or the court of the captor held in 
the country of an ally or co-belligerent.189  He posited that courts of the ally or co-belligerent 
were not competent to hold plea of captures made by anyone other than itself.190  He explained 
that condemnations in the port of an ally or co-belligerent were frequent, but there had never 
been a case of a condemnation in the court of an ally.191  Hoffman stressed that the “very silence 
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of the writer on the law of admiralty as to this subject, and the absence of all judicial authority, 
argues the soundness of the doctrine contended for.”192 
Additionally, Hoffman presented a compelling policy argument regarding the worldwide 
importance of judicial inquiry into the regularity of prize proceedings.193   He explained that the 
capturing nation had an interest in knowing that its own prize rules were adhered too, and its own 
courts were best equip to ensure that the rules are complied with since they were the most 
competent on the subject.194  The country of the captured belligerent has an interest in the 
property taken in order to compel a party in the wrong to pay retribution, for the principals in the 
war to settle accounts, and in that it is mutually responsible for the justice and regularity of all 
hostile acts.195  Lastly, neutral nations were concerned that the courts of that capturing 
belligerent refuse to inquire into the regularity and validity of seizures made from them.196  
Hoffman reasoned “there appears to be a moral fitness in the rule which would restrict the power 
of condemnation to the tribunals of that belligerent by whom the property was actually taken.”197 
In addition to his objections as to the validity and mode of authenticating the 
condemnation, and the competency of the tribunal pronouncing the condemnation, Hoffman 
asserted that the Court should be provided with proof of “an alliance or association in arms 
between Venezuela, the alleged ally, and the power, whatever that may be, under which 
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[Almeida] pretends to have acted.”198  Hoffman stated that the Court had no evidence that the 
condemnation was even pronounced by the court of an ally, because there had been no 
commission produced and the barren condemnation did not acknowledge the power granting any 
commission to Almeida.199  The necessity of proving the alliance was another added reason for 
demanding the production of something more than the bare sentence of condemnation.200 
Hoffman also contended that if all of his previous objections were deemed unfounded, he 
maintained that a condemnation by a court of competent jurisdiction did not divest the United 
States Supreme Court of its power to restore the property to the rightful owners.201  He asserted 
that the exercise of that power is essential to the maintenance of the United States’ own laws and 
neutrality.202  He reminded the Court that it is within its ability to undo that which has been done 
in breach of U.S. laws, but only so far as to place both parties into their positions prior to the 
illegal act.203  Hoffman explained that the only inquiry needed by the Court was whether or not 
Almeida acquired the possession of the Arrogante Barcelones by means unlawful to the United 
States.204  If the Court determined that Almeida fraudulently acquired possession of the brig, it 
was the Court’s duty to restore it to the rightful Spanish owners from whom it has been seized by 
the illegal instrumentality of our citizens. 
Hoffman’s final, and briefest argument was that Almeida was not a neutral purchaser 
because captured the brig Arrogante Barcelones for his own benefit.205  He asserted that 
Almeida’s eventual possession of the brig was gained from his own wrong and therefore he 
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could not, by his own acts, give himself a better title to the brig206.  Essentially, the 
“condemnation could only corroborate the title which [Almeida] had gained, and could not 
clothe him with a better one.”207 
C. Almeida’s Rebuttal Argument 
After such expansive arguments by Hoffman, Winder opted to rebut.  He denied the rule 
asserted by Hoffman that it was necessary for the libel to accompany the sentence of 
condemnation, since the sentence showed what the libel would show.208  Furthermore, he 
asserted that the U.S. Supreme Court had never inquired further into proceedings and instead had 
always admitted the conclusiveness of the sentence of condemnation, even as to the collateral 
effects.209 
As for the competency of the Court of Juan Griego, Winder asserted that the connection 
between all of the revolutionary Spanish provinces was notorious, that even the President had 
acknowledged the present state of common contest of the provinces again Spain, and that courts 
generally took those facts into consideration.210  He asserted that Venezuela was known to be at 
war with Spain, and that the brig Arrogante Barcelones was the property of Spain, her enemy, 
brought into her country.211  He negated Hoffman’s assertion, and stated that there was no 
positive authority denying the authority of courts of a co-belligerent from condemning prizes 
captured by its co-belligerent, and thus it was sufficient that “no reason of principle or public 
policy exists to prevent it.”212 
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D. Justice Johnson’s Decision 
Oddly enough, as the Supreme Court at time surprises, the decision in this case was not 
founded in either side’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of either the condemnation of the 
documentation evidence provided.213  Instead, the Supreme Court found Hoffman’s final 
argument persuasive—ultimately basing the majority opinion on it.214  After reviewing all the 
evidence and arguments, Justice Johnson explained the Court’s conclusion of the facts.  
“[Almeida] not only violated the neutrality of [the United States] government, but effected his 
purpose by practising a flagrant fraud, either upon his crew, or upon the revenue officers of the 
port of Baltimore; or perhaps upon both.”215  Justice Johnson continued by stating that every 
aspect of the case proved that the sealing voyage around Cape Horn was a mere ruse.216  The 
unquestionable truth was that the crew completely understood the privateering venture from the 
start.217  Their only misled belief was that their artificial ignorance, or the audacity of the 
scheme, would shield them from punishment for entering into belligerent service.218  Although 
the actions of the were not at issue,219 the explanation by Justice Johnson expresses the 
fraudulent nature of the entire enterprise in this case, and more generally in Baltimore’s patriot 
privateers. 
Without all the linguistics, there were only a few arguments made by either party.  
Winder argued that (1) the neutrality laws were not violated because the Louisa was a foreign 
vessel, commissioned, owned, and outfitted in the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, a 
sovereign nation at war with Spain; and (2) that Almeida was the bona fide purchaser of the 
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Arrogante Barcelones.220  In response, Hoffman argued that in fact, the Louisa was owned and 
outfitted in the United States as a privateer to cruise against Spain in violation of the United 
States’ neutrality laws.221  Despite the detailed arguments regarding the sufficiency of the 
condemnation and the documentation provided at trial, the United States Supreme Court opinion 
avoids acknowledging or basing its opinion on those grounds.222  Justice Johnson acknowledged 
that while there was no question that Almeida was a flagrant offender against the neutrality laws 
of the United States, the only roadblock in applying the established rule of the Court in cases of 
illegal outfitting was the condemnation of the vessel and cargo in the Court of Margaritta.223  
Thus, Justice Johnson circumvented the issue in his opinion by waiving all expression of its 
opinion on the questions raised upon the validity of the condemnation or the sufficiency of the 
documentation produced to prove it.224 
Instead, the United States Supreme Court rested its opinion on a “single, and independent 
ground” for future similar cases to be clearly understood.225  The United States Supreme Court 
found the captured property, the brig Arrogante Barcelones, to be in the possession of the 
offender, Almeida, and held it irrelevant through what roundabout or devious course the property 
returned to him.226  The Court asserted that Almeida could not claim a legal right to the brig 
Arrogante Barcelones springing out of his own fraudulent actions.227  Justice Johnson briefly 
acknowledge Winder’s assertion of Almeida’s title as a bona fide purchaser, when he explained 
that while a third party purchaser with a valid and authenticated condemnation without notice of 
fraud may in many cases hold his purchase free from interest or restitution, Almeida’s offensive 
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touch in this case “restores the taint from which the condemnation may have purified the 
prize.”228  Justice Johnson229 concluded that courts of justice will never yield the right of a party 
to appear and be heard before a court to the individual who is forced to trace his title through his 
own criminal acts.230 
VI. Does the Arrrogante Barcelones Apply Today? 
The Arrogante Barcelones is still good case law in that its opinion has not been 
overturned, however the opinion has not been cited or directly discussed in subsequent case law 
either.  In the Court’s opinion, Justice Johnson briefly referenced the concept of bona fide 
purchasers.231  Despite its lack of citing history, The Arrogante Barcelones addressed an 
important principle of property law that still exists today—the protected status of bona fide 
purchasers.  It became clear in The Arrogante Barcelones that Joseph Almeida was not in fact a 
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bona fide purchaser.232  As the Court correctly stated, his touch to the title of the brig that he 
bought at public auction restored the taint of his criminal acts—the illegal capture.233 
The concept of bona fide purchasers, or good faith purchasers, is one that has evolved 
with commercial transactions in the United States.  In The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing 
Principles and Property Interests, John Dolan provides that “the good faith purchase rule permits 
the taker to receive interests greater than those his transferor possessed.”234  He explains that 
courts have rationalized this somewhat illogical principle based on fairness in two different 
ways.235  “Some assert that is it a question of the fault or negligence of the true owner or his 
creditor.”236  Those cases emphasize the culpability of the true property owner who does not 
protect his interest in his property.237  Those cases explain that but for the true property owner’s 
negligence, the innocent purchaser would not have been misled by the appearance of the 
property.238  Other courts focused on purely economic notions, asserting that the good faith 
purchaser doctrine is economically efficient and commercially convenient.239  Both doctrines 
evolved based on perceived needs the United States’ commercial expansion.240  Specifically, 
“staunch notions that a man should never be stripped of property without his consent flowed 
naturally from the prairie frontier and from high seas traversed by privateers, and demanded the 
development of rules upholding security of property in the face of lawless taking.”241 
By commercial standards today, in general a buyer may be considered a bona fide 
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purchaser, or good faith purchaser, as long as they have no knowledge that another party has 
interest or ownership rights to the goods or property in question.242  A good faith purchaser is not 
specifically defined in the UCC, however, good faith means “honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned.”243  Merchants have to observe and comply with the reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.244  A purchaser is “one who obtains an interest 
in property through a voluntary transaction.”245  Although bona fide purchasers are not 
specifically defined, several articles of the Uniformed Commercial Code provide rules to protect 
bona fide purchasers of certain types of personal property from prior claims to the property.246  
Thus the Court in The Arrogante Barcelones elicited one of the first judicial opinions regarding 
bona fide purchasers and criminal acts that can taint ones title. 
VII. Conclusion 
The case of The Arrogante Barcelones involved the cleverness of Joseph Almeida247 and 
the web of complicated set of circumstance he contrived.248  Almeida’s tactics, are better 
understood in the context of nineteenth century Baltimore, the War of 1812, and U.S. citizens’ 
involvement in South American privateering.249  With this set of facts, it would have made sense 
for the maritime case to hinge on the validity of the commission, condemnation, and 
documentation evidence.250  Instead, the Supreme Court ignored the arguments and propositions 
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by the attorneys in this case, and grounds its decision in property law principles.251  Thus Justice 
Johnson delivered a sound, yet unexpected, articulation of bona fide purchasers252 and their role 
in property law in privateering cases of the nineteenth century.253 
 
VIII. Biographical Sketches  
A. Joseph Almeida 
Joseph Almeida was a man dedicated to the life of a privateer, no matter what country he 
sailed for.  Almeida was not alone in this regard, and many Baltimore merchants undertook new 
roles as privateers in support of the South American Revolutions.  Unfortunately, Almeida’s skill 
was ultimately his undoing—not only with the United States courts, but also with the Republic of 
Spain. 
Joseph Almeida was described as a man with mesmerizing blue eyes, long blonde curls 
draping over his broad shoulders, and generally sunworn features.254  He emigrated from the 
Portuguese Azores in 1796 and quickly built a reputation as a seaman.255  In 1803, Almeida 
became master of the Portuguese brig the Pastor.256  While commanding the Pastor, Almeida’s 
voyages included frequent stops in Baltimore where he met his first wife Ann, whom he settled 
down with on Duke Street257 and married.258  In 1805 Almeida became a father, and a United 
States citizen.259  Unfortunately, Ann died in February 1814 while Almeida was at sea, leaving 
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their four children motherless.260  Nevertheless, Almeida carried on and soon married Teresa, in 
the summer of 1814.261  Together they shared the home on Duke Street while they added more 
children to the family.262   
Upon his arrival to the United States Almeida labored to purchase his own vessel, which 
he finally did in 1805.263  During his time privateering, Almeida owned and commanded 
numerous brigs including: Mary, New Mary, Joseph and Mary, Caroline, Kemp, Lousia, 
Congreso/Orb, Wilson/Bolivar, Pichiucha, Presidentia, Friends Hope.264 During the War of 
1812, Almeida captured no fewer than thirty-five British ships and made almost $300,000 in net 
prize proceeds.265  In December 1814, when Almeida spotted a convoy of nine British vessels, he 
singlehandedly outfought seven of the vessels, and captured five.266 
After facing excessively brutal treatment by the Spanish in Carthegena, Almeida was 
eventually released, but suffered humiliation and the loss of his ship.267  Providentially, in 1816 
Thomas Taylor approached him with a business proposition to assist Buenos Aires as a 
privateersman in its struggle for liberation by preying on Spanish ships.268  To a bitter Almeida, 
this seemed like the perfect opportunity for revenge.269  In an 1817 letter from Almeida to Mr. 
President of the Consulate of Cadiz, Almeida expressed his repugnance for the Spanish Empire 
and announced his vendetta against it.270  During his time as a South American privateer, 
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Almeida targeted the Spanish by interrupting supply lines between Spain and its colonies, 
intercepting royal communications, and viciously pillaging Spanish vessels and cargos worth 
several million dollars.271 
While Almeida became infamous to the Spanish as a notorious pirate, he also became 
very well known in the United States—both judicially and politically.   The amount of criminal 
and civil suits stirred or commenced by Almeida is remarkable, and between 1820-1825 at least 
three cases involving him reached the United States Supreme Court.272   In fact, “the 
embarrassing extent to which Almeida flouted federal laws and treaties provoked President 
Monroe on one occasion to dispatch a navy gunboat and a detachment of U.S. artillerists to rein 
him in.”273  He even earned a reputation with Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, whom in 
1819 after receiving an unexpected but colorful first-hand account of Almeida’s personal life and 
career, was so fascinated by Almeida he included the encounter in his memoirs.274 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Schooner Congreso September 12, 1817 
      Mr. President of the Consulate of Cadiz 
My Dear Sir: 
 If the Government of Spain would have dealt with me as right reason and the law of persons demands, and 
at the same time, if the Spanish would have recognized the independence of Buenos Aires, I would never have taken 
up arms against your nation.  As for me, they treated me wickedly in Carthagena, seized my brig, treated me with 
both word and deed, in the end stripping me naked, could I have been treated any worse? 
 They have treated me like a Pirate, and who?  The true pirates are the Spanish American Governors 
appointed by the King… I am not a pirate, I merely defend the rights of the Homeland, and I will continue making 
war until I shed my blood for its independence. 
 The various ships that I have taken on these coasts are guarantees of my humanity.  It is not my character to 
hurt the poor, but rather the prideful and zealous Spanish.   
 In Havana you are holding some of my men prisoner, and if I get word that you try to extort them to the 
least degree, or that they are not immediately released, I will change my privateering methods, and direct these 
methods at you, so that you will do your part and release these people. 
 
      Your Servant, 
      Jose Almeyda 
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After increasing harassment by the U.S. law enforcement, Almeida packed up his family 
and fled to St. Bart’s in May 1822.275  For the remainder of his life he continued privateering 
under commissions for various South American revolutionary governments.276  Due to 
Almeida’s constant persecution of the Spanish Empire, Spain issued a proclamation, and 
possibly an award, for the “notorious pirate’s” arrest.277  The Spanish finally captured Almeida 
in 1827, thirteen years after his confinement by them in Carthagena.278  They kept Almeida 
imprisoned in the vaults of “El Morro” for over four years shackled to its sandstone walls.279  
Almeida was eventually executed on Valentine’s Day 1832.280  He received “all spiritual 
remedies required” by the Catholic Church before being executed by his Most Catholic Majesty 
King Ferdinand VII of Spain’s soldier’s musket shots.281  
B. David Hoffman 
 
David Hoffman was a prominent lawyer, teacher, and author in nineteenth century 
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Baltimore, Maryland.282  He was the founder and first professor at what would come to be, 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.283  David Hoffman was a “pioneer in 
legal though and scholarship” and an “exponent of ethical conduct in the practice of law.”284  His 
scholarly works were ahead of his time, but are still renowned almost two centuries later.285  
While Hoffman built his law career in Baltimore, he grew into a worldly attorney with degrees 
and publications spanning across the Atlantic.286 
David Hoffman was born in Baltimore, Maryland on December 24, 1784.287  David 
Hoffman was the eleventh of twelve children born to prominent Baltimore merchant Peter 
Hoffman and his wife Dorothea.288  Instead of going into the family’s dry goods business, David 
decided to take a different path and pursue a career in law.289  He attended St. John’s University 
in Annapolis, Maryland for three years, and then returned to Baltimore to “read law.”290  David 
became a member of the Maryland Bar in the early nineteenth century.291  “By 1816, his 
lucrative practice in bustling Baltimore, the nation’s third largest city, netted him $9,000 a year, 
a very healthy sum by the standards of the day.”292 
While David flourished financially in commercial practice, he preferred scholarly 
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work.293    In 1816, David accepted a position as professor of law at the University of Maryland 
Law Institute.294  Since apprenticeship was how an individual ascended to legal practice in 1814, 
no law courses were being taught in Maryland when David accepted the position.295  However, 
David was committed to teaching the future lawyers of the United States, and he set aside most 
of his professional time to develop curriculum for the law school.296  “Hoffman was convinced 
that his generation of practitioners had become too divorced from the philosophical debates of 
the nation’s founding to appreciate the vision of law – and of lawyering – required in 
America.”297  Thus, after years of work, David published, A Course of Legal Study, in 1817.298  
“A Course of Legal Study was immediately and lavishly praised for its learnedness,”299 and 
Judge Joseph Story even pronounced it "by far the most perfect system for the study of the law 
which has ever been offered to the public."300  The publication “elicited the highest encomiums 
from legal authorities throughout the country” and instantly gave David a national reputation, 
later leading to the highest foreign honors.301 
Unfortunately for David, his teaching was ahead of his time, and he finally stopped in 
1839.302  In 1843 he officially resigned from University of Maryland, and was graciously 
thanked by the trustees for all his contributions.303  That same year he relocated with his family 
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to Philadelphia, with the idea to revive his Law Institute there.304  Four years later his scholarly 
work took him to Europe, where “he published in the London Times a series of articles on 
political, social, and economic conditions in the United States.”305  David’s return to the United 
States in 1853 was brief—he passed away in New York City on November 11, 1854 at the age of 
sixty-nine.306  David was  
David married Mary McKean, a woman from a prominent Philadelphia family, in 
1816.307  Mary was the granddaughter of Governor Thomas McKean, and was regarded for he 
beauty and charm.308  They had their first son in 1817, the same year David published his work, 
A Course of Legal Study.309  Of the three children David and Mary Hoffman had, only his 
daughter survived him.310 
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